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SIMMONS V. TUOMEY REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER AND OSBORNE V. ADAMS:
EXPANDING OR LIMITING PATIENTS' ACCESS TO
QUALITY CARE?
I. INTRODUCTION
"Public policy is a dynamic not static concept, and what was valid in the
past is not necessarily a valid policy today."' Over the last century, hospitals
have undergone a metamorphosis, changing from charitable institutions
providing care for the poor (and receiving immunity from tort suits as a reward)
into today's hybrid corporate-community institutions-part medical service
provider and part corporate enterprise.' This change in hospital organization
has been mirrored by a change in public perception.
3 Today's hospitals have
adopted many of the advertising tactics of corporations in other industries,
4 and
the lack of adequate health insurance has forced many under-insureds to use
hospital emergency rooms as sources of both primary and acute medical care.
As a result, hospitals are now often perceived as providers of medical services
rather than institutions in which physicians treat patients with acute or chronic
illnesses.5
With its decisions in Simmons v. Tuomey Regional Medical Center
6
(Simmons II) and Osborne v. Adams,7 (Osborne II) the South Carolina Supreme
Court expanded hospital tort liability and brought it into compliance with
changed public perceptions regarding hospitals as medical providers.
Recognizing that a hospital holding itself out to the public as a provider of
medical services has a duty to insure the quality of those services, the court
adopted a new test in Simmons II and Osborne II for determining a hospital's
liability for the torts of its independently contracted physicians. To determine
whether a hospital should be liable for a physician's negligence, the court
focused on the way a hospital was perceived within the community rather than
1. Fitzer v. Greater Greenville S.C. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 277 S.C. 1, 3, 282
S.E.2d 230, 231 (1981).
2. Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution
of the American Health Care System, 108 HARv. L. REv. 381, 385-87 (1994); Steven R. Owens,
Note, Pamperin v. Trinity Memorial Hospital and the Evolution ofHospitalLiability: Wisconsin
Adopts Apparent Agency, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1129, 1135-36.
3. Martin C. McWilliams, Jr. & Hamilton E. Russell, III, Hospital Liability for Torts of
Independent Contractor Physicians, 47 S.C. L. REv. 431, 436 (1996).
4. See id. at 436; Owens, supra note 2, at 1137.
5. See McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at 436.
6. 341 S.C. 32, 533 S.E.2d 312 (2000) [hereinafter Simmons I1].
7. 346 S.C. 4, 550 S.E.2d 319 (2001) [hereinafter Osborne 11].
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the way the patient perceived the relationship between the hospital and the
treating physician.
In Simmons II the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted a test for a
hospital-owed nondelegable duty based on section 429 of the Restatement of
Torts.! In Osborne Hlthe court solidified its stance on hospital liability, holding
that a hospital may be responsible for the quality of care provided by
physicians treating patients in areas of the hospital beyond the emergency
room.9 In both cases, the court used public policy as the foundation for its
decision, claiming that a hospital, which holds itself out as a provider of
medical services and a supplier of qualified physicians, cannot evade
responsibility when treatment goes awry.10 However, the court unfortunately
treats public policy in each case as a single, mobilized concern and ignores
other policy considerations that may be detrimentally affected by the court's
decisions.
This Note discusses Osborne II and the South Carolina Supreme Court's
reasons for broadening hospital liability. Part II of this Note traces the erosion
of hospital immunity in South Carolina and describes the supreme court's
adoption of the nondelegable duty doctrine for hospital emergency rooms. Part
III briefly examines the national trend regarding the expansion of hospital tort
liability. Part IV discusses the importance of the court's decision in Simmons
v. Tuomey Regional Medical Center. Finally, Part V analyzes Osborne II and
possible problems and other issues resulting from the decision. This Note
concludes that, although Osborne II effectively applies the test outlined in
Simmons II, the court's expansion of the nondelegable duty doctrine disregards
public policy concerns, such as access, that may ultimately have a negative
impact on patient care in South Carolina.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Erosion of the Charitable Immunity Doctrine
Traditionally, most private, for profit hospitals were charitable
organizations that were immune from tort liability under the common law
doctrine of charitable immunity because of the public service function they
served." For example, in Lindler v. Columbia Hospital2 the South Carolina
Supreme Court explained that "[t]he true ground upon which to rest the
exemption from liability is that it would be against public policy to hold a
charitable institution [such as a hospital] responsible for the negligence of its
8. Simmons II, 341 S.C. at 53, 533 S.E.2d at 323.
9. Osborne II, 346 S.C. at 4, 550 S.E.2d at 321.
10. See id. at 4, 550 S.E.2d at 321; Simmons II, 341 S.C. at 50-51, 533 S.E.2d at 322.11. Abraham & Weiler, supra note 2, at 385-86; McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at
434-35; Owens, supra note 2, at 1135-36.
12. 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914).
[Vol. 54: 519
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servants, selected with due care." 3 Although Justice Fraser dissented, arguing
that charitable institutions should be required to remedy the harm they cause, 4
the popular view was that supporting charitable organizations benefitted the
public as a whole. 5 After all, hospitals at the time predominantly served the
poor and very ill. Those that could afford medical treatment were treated by
family physicians at home. Hospitals provided limited treatment and served
primarily as places of last resort before death.'6 Many courts reasoned that the
funds collected by such institutions should be put to use for their patients and
not used to satisfy legal judgments for negligent care.' 7
However, as the function of hospitals and the public perception of their
place in society changed, states began reexamining the policy grounds for
immunizing hospitals from tort liability.' In Brown v. Anderson County
Hospital Ass 'n,'9 decided in 1977, South Carolina joined many other states in
modifying the charitable immunity doctrine. In Brown a widow with nine
children brought a wrongful death suit against a hospital whose employee had
left her husband strapped to his hospital bed during a fire.2" Basing its
discussion on Justice Fraser's dissent in Lindler, the majority held that a
charitable hospital could be held liable if the plaintiff could prove "the injuries
occurred because of the hospital's heedlessness and reckless disregard of the
plaintiff s rights."'" Although Brown required the plaintiff to prove more than
simple negligence, the decision began the decline of charitable immunity in
South Carolina, which was completed when the South Carolina Supreme Court
abolished the doctrine in Fitzer v. Greater Greenville S.C. Young Men's
Christian Ass 'n.2
In Fitzer the court examined the ideas that once served as the foundation
for the charitable immunity doctrine for hospitals, and the court found these
notions no longer existed. 3 Justice Ness explained:
13. Id. at28,81 S.E. at 513.
14. Id. at 35, 81 S.E. at 515 (Fraser, J., dissenting) ("It is a principle of law as well as
morals, that men must be just before they are generous. There is no higher or more just principle
than that a trust fund shall remedy the evil itself has done, before it attempts to remedy the evils
done by others.").
15. See Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 78 A. 898 (Me. 1910); Schloendorffv. Soc'y
of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914); Vermillion v. Woman's Coll. of Due West, 104 S.C.
197, 88 S.E. 649 (1916).
16. See Owens, supra note 2, at 1131-32.
17. See Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 92; McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at 434-35.
18. See, e.g., Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9 (N.Y. 1957) (holding that a hospital may be
liable to patients for injuries caused by the negligence of the hospital employees acting within
the scope of employment and consequently abandoning the doctrine of hospital immunity for the
negligence of its employees).
19. 268 S.C. 479, 234 S.E.2d 873 (1977).
20. Id. at 482, 234 S.E.2d at 874.
21. Id. at 487, 234 S.E.2d at 876-77.
22. 277 S.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 230 (1981).
23. Id. at 3-4, 282 S.E.2d at 231-32.
2002]
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Public policy is a dynamic not static concept, and what was
valid in the past is not necessarily a valid policy today.
Moreover, when the reason for a declared public policy no
longer exists, we should not hesitate to abolish it and the rules
which are supported by the policy.
24
Reference to the dynamic nature of public policy was to become a recurring
theme in later appellate court cases discussing hospital liability.
B. Liability for the Torts of Independent Contractors
Although South Carolina courts abrogated hospitals' charitable immunity,
courts continued to shield hospitals from liability with other traditional
doctrines, including respondeat superior and vicarious liability, until the early
1990s. In 1993 and 1994, the South Carolina Court of Appeals decided two
cases, Shuler v. Tuomey Regional Medical Center, Inc.2" and Strickland v.
Madden,6 both accepting hospital liability based on a theory of apparent
agency. Although both Shuler and Strickland affirmed summary judgment for
the hospital, the cases allowed a hospital to be held vicariously liable under an
apparent agency theory if the plaintiff establishes (1) the hospital consciously
or impliedly represents the negligent individual to be its agent, (2) the plaintiff
relied upon the hospital's representation, and (3) the plaintiff detrimentally
changed his position based on that reliance.27
According to the court of appeals' decisions, the South Carolina test
corresponded to the elements of apparent agency and estoppel from the
popularly applied2" Restatement ofAgency section 267:
24. Id. at 3, 282 S.E.2d at 231. Justice Ness's opinion states in no uncertain terms that
"[tlhe doctrine of charitable immunity has no place in today's society." Id. However, following
Fitzer, the state legislature enacted some limited statutory vestiges of charitable immunity by
including a cap on damages recoverable against charitable organizations, see S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 33-56-180 (Supp. 2001), and giving limited protection for members of the governing boards
of certain nonprofit organizations, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-31-202(b), -834 (Supp. 2001).
25. 313 S.C. 225, 437 S.E.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1993).
26. 323 S.C. 63, 448 S.E.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1994); see also Robin Sloan Cromer, Note,
Court Considers Limitations on Recovery for Emotional Distress, Adoption of Doctrine of
Corporate Negligence, 47 S.C. L. REv. 160 (1995) (summarizing the facts, reasoning, and
holding of Strickland).
27. Strickland, 323 S.C. at 70, 448 S.E.2d at 585; Shuler, 313 S.C. at 227, 437 S.E.2d at
129.
28. See, e.g., Brown v. Coastal Emergency Servs., Inc., 354 S.E.2d 632, 636 (Ga. Ct. App.
1987) (noting that the doctrine of apparent agency has been adopted "by the courts of every other
state in which it has been asserted as a basis of liability"). Many other jurisdictions have
accepted the doctrine of apparent or ostensible agency. See Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843
(N.D. Ga. 1981); Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987); Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose,
683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985); Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 426 N.E.2d 1187 (Ohio Ct. App.
1980); Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
[Vol. 54: 519
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One who represents that another is his servant or other agent
and thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the
care or skill for such apparent agent is subject to liability to
the third person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of
the one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were
such.29
As the comments to section 267 explain, "The rule normally applies where the
plaintiff has submitted himself to the care or protection of an apparent servant
in response to an invitation from the defendant to enter into such relations with
such servant."3 The popularity of applying section 267 is understandable
because of the inherent difficulty in proving hospital liability for the
malpractice of independent contractor physicians via respondeat superior.3 In
addition, the court of appeals' adoption of the apparent agency doctrine in
Shuler and Strickland32 was fairly traditional, focusing more on a strict
application of the doctrine itself than on the shifting public policy upon which
the adoption was based.33 However, other courts have not enforced the test for
apparent agency as strictly.
III. APPROACHES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
South Carolina is not alone in applying the doctrine of apparent agency in
order to make determinations of hospital tort liability. Courts across the country
have held that liability may be imposed when the actions of the physician are
reasonably viewed to be the actions of the hospital either through apparent
authority or agency.34 Although many courts agree that apparent agency may
support imposing liability based on estoppel, courts have adopted different
standards for determining when the appearance of agency exists.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1957).
30. Id. § 267 cmt. a.
31. See McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at 438-45.
32. Strickland does recognize that other courts have adopted the doctrine of corporate
negligence based on the "public's perception of and reliance on [the] hospital as [a] multi-
faceted health care facility, as well as [the] hospital's superior position to monitor and control
physician performance," 323 S.C. at 72, 448 S.E.2d at 586 (citing Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d
166 (Wash. 1984)), and suggests that if South Carolina adopted the doctrine and resulting duties,
then a standard of care would have to be established. 323 S.C. at 72, 448 S.E.2d at 586.
However, the court mentioned no public policy considerations beyond this brief discussion.
33. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at 433, 472.
34. See Bynum v. Magno, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (D. Haw. 2000); Butkiewicz v. Loyola
Univ. Med. Ctr., 724 N.E.2d 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Guadagnoli v. Seaview Radiology, P.C.,
712 N.Y.S.2d 812 (App. Div. 2000); Espalin v. Children's Med. Ctr. of Dallas, 27 S.W.3d 675
(Tex. Ct. App. 2000); Valdez v. Pasadena Healthcare Mgmt., 975 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Ct. App.
1998); Kashishian v. Al-Bitar, 535 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995); see also 40A AM. JUR. 2d
Hospitals and Asylums § 47 (1999) (citing additional cases).
2002]
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For instance, in Illinois and Wisconsin, courts have held that a hospital
may be liable under an apparent agency theory when a patient could reasonably
assume that a physician was employed by the hospital, even if no express
representation had been made.35 However, in Texas, Connecticut, and Hawaii,
plaintiffs bear a more demanding burden of proof. In these jurisdictions, a
plaintiff must prove three elements, which are similar to those found in section
267: (1) a reasonable belief that the physician was the employee of the
hospital; (2) the belief is prefaced on some act of the hospital or physician; and
(3) the patient justifiably relied on the representation of authority.36
Unfortunately, it is difficult to classify the existing case literature because so
many of the cases apply different tests in the name of apparent or ostensible
agency. A recent California Court of Appeals opinion claims that
[a]lthough the cases discussing ostensible agency use various
linguistic formulations to describe the elements of the
doctrine, in essence, they require the same two elements: (1)
conduct by the hospital that would cause a reasonable person
to believe that the physician was an agent of the hospital, and
(2) reliance on that apparent agency relationship by the
plaintiff.
3"
However, the simplicity of this owes more to courts' desire to allow
plaintiffs access to hospital defendants than it does to any theory of agency
liability like that found in the Restatement.3 Undoubtedly, the California court
is correct in claiming that "there is really only one relevant factual issue:
whether the patient had reason to know that the physician was not an agent of
the hospital."39 In most jurisdictions imposing liability under the guise of
apparent agency,
hospitals are generally deemed to have held themselves out
as the provider of services unless they gave the patient
35. Butkiewicz, 724 N.E.2d at 1040 (finding that a hospital may be liable for the torts of
an independent contractor physician, unless the patient knows or should know that the physician
is an independent contractor, regardless of whether the physician is or is not an emergency room
doctor); Kashishian, 535 N.W.2d at 108 (finding that patients, especially those in an emergency
room, are entitled to assume that unfamiliar hospital workers are employees instead of
independent contractors).
36. Bynum, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1266 (holding that recovery based on apparent authority
requires a plaintiff to show that the hospital "actually did something to imply authority" and to
show that the plaintiff relied on that representation of authority); Valdez, 975 S.W.2d at 46-47
(granting summary judgment for defendant when the plaintiff could not designate any action by
which the hospital presented the physician as its agent, even though the physician was an
emergency room doctor).
37. Mejia v. Cmty. Hosp. of San Bernardino, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 233, 236 (Ct. App. 2002).
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1957).
39. Mejia, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 237.
[Vol. 54: 519
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contrary notice, and the patient is generally presumed to have
looked to the hospital for care unless he or she was treated by
his or her personal physician. Thus, unless the patient had
some reason to know of the true relationship between the
hospital and the physician-i.e., because the hospital gave the
patient actual notice or because the patient was treated by his
or her personal physician-ostensible agency is readily
inferred.' °
Some courts have gone so far as to conclude that a hospital which provides
emergency room services to the public is estopped from denying an agency
relationship between the hospital and its emergency room staff."' Most of these
court decisions, like that of the California court, rely on public perception
rather than the Restatement for their authority: "[B]ecause it is commonly
believed that hospitals are the actual providers of care, ostensible agency can
be readily inferred whenever someone seeks treatment at a hospital.7
42
Compared to this simplistic rationale, it is imminently reasonable to impose a
nondelegable duty, based on section 429 of the Restatement of Torts, on
hospitals to provide competent care to emergency room patients after a plaintiff
satisfies the test.
IV. SIMMONS V. TUOMEY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Simmons v. Tuomey Regional Medical Center43 (Simmons 1) involved a
medical malpractice action against both a hospital and two emergency room
physicians, alleging that the physicians' negligent diagnosis and treatment
contributed to a patient's death. ' The trial court granted the hospital's
summary judgment motion, relying primarily on a contract between the
hospital and a practice group that supplied the hospital's emergency room
physicians.4" The contract referred to the physicians many times as
"independent contractors" and stated that the hospital agreed that it would not
exercise "any control over the means, manner, or methods by which any
Physician supplied by [the group] carries out his duties."46 The plaintiff
40. Id.
41. Torrence v. Kusminsky, 408 S.E.2d 684,692 (W.Va. 1991); see also Paintsville Hosp.
Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Ky. 1985) (stating that although hospital liability is not
limitless, "the operation of a hospital emergency room open to the public, where the public
comes expecting medical care to be provided through the normal operating procedures within
the hospital, falls within the limits for application of the principles of ostensible agency and
apparent authority").
42. Mejia, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 239.
43. 330 S.C. 115, 498 S.E.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1998) [hereinafter Simmons 1].
44. Id. at 116, 498 S.E.2d at 408.
45. Id. at 116-17, 498 S.E.2d at 408-09.
46. Id. at 117, 498 S.E.2d at 409.
2002]
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appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on
the issues of actual agency, apparent agency, and nondelegable duty.47 The
South Carolina Court of Appeals only ruled on the third issue, holding "that a
hospital's duty to its emergency room patients to provide competent medical
care has evolved into an absolute duty that is incapable of being delegated.
4
1
Unlike Strickland49 and Shuler5° the court of appeals' decision in Simmons
I acknowledged the decisive role of public perceptions and noted that
"[c]onsideration of the effect of public policy in the medical care arena leads
us to this conclusion."'" Chief Judge Howell's opinion notes the important role
hospital emergency rooms have in providing immediate care and the resulting
public reliance on hospital emergency rooms.52 Citing a South Carolina
Department of Health and Environmental Control regulation that requires
hospitals to maintain a perpetually open emergency room, 3 the opinion
concludes that the public's perception unifying hospitals and their emergency
rooms effectively abrogates a hospital's immunity for the torts of independent
contractors: "Given the cumulative public policies surrounding the operation
of emergency rooms and the legal requirement that hospitals provide
emergency services, we firmly believe that hospitals must be accountable in
tort for the actions of care givers working in their emergency rooms. 5 4
The change from Shuler and Strickland is marked. While Strickland merely
alluded to the possibility of adopting corporate negligence when hospitals
negligently select and supervise employees," Simmons Ieffectively abandons
the concept in favor of strict liability for hospitals whose employees and
independent contractors act negligently."6 Furthermore, the Simmons I court
made no attempt to ground the decision in preexisting law, endorsing a New
York court opinion, which stated that "it is public policy, and not traditional
rules of the law of agency or the law of torts, which should underlie the
decision to hold hospitals liable for malpractice which occurs in their
emergency rooms."57 In affirming the court's decision, the South Carolina
Supreme Court focused on two aspects of it-the strict, nondelegable duty
47. Id.
48. Id. at 118, 498 S.E.2d at 409.
49. 323 S.C. 63, 448 S.E.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1994).
50. 313 S.C. 225, 437 S.E.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1993).
51. 330 S.C. at 118, 498 S.E.2d at 409.
52. Id. at 120-22, 498 S.E.2d at 410-11.
53. 24A S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 61-16 § 613 (1976) (requiring each hospital to provide
various emergency services, unless all the hospitals in a subdivision plan designate a specific
hospital within the plan to be the provider of emergency medical services).
54. Simmons I, 330 S.C. at 124, 498 S.E.2d at 412.
55. Strickland, 323 S.C. at 72, 448 S.E.2d at 586.
56. See Simmons 1, 330 S.C. at 123, 498 S.E.2d at 412.
57. Id. at 124,498 S.E.2d at 412 (quoting Martell v. St. Charles Hosp., 523 N.Y.S.2d 342,
352 (App. Div. 1987)).
(Vol. 54: 519
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placed on hospitals and the lack of traditional authority for imposing that
duty.
5 8
The supreme court ultimately agreed with the court of appeals that the
changed public perception of hospitals necessitated additional imposition of
liability." It also agreed that South Carolina law allows for the imposition of
a nondelegable duty in certain circumstances. 0 As the court explained, various
South Carolina cases impose nondelegable duties on individuals:
A principle that applies in cases of poorly repaired brick
floors and sloppily loaded cargo certainly applies to situations
in which people must entrust that most personal of things,
their physical well-being, to physicians at an emergency room
intimately connected with and closely controlled by a
hospital."
However, the supreme court limited the nondelegable duty so that it does not
necessitate a holding of strict liability on the hospital.62
The court's reasons for imposing liability on hospitals is based on claims
ofnondelegable duties and the apparent agency principle adopted in Shuler and
Strickland. Under apparent agency, the court noted that "[t]he focus is on the
acts and conduct of the principal, not the agent."63 Because the apparent agency
doctrine is difficult to satisfy, requiring representation from the hospital and
proof of reliance on behalf of the plaintiff, most courts have relaxed the
requirements when applying the doctrine in the emergency room setting in
order to impose liability on the hospital." Although the resulting "application"
of the doctrine has been criticized, the supreme court agreed
that expecting a patient in an emergency situation to debate
or comprehend the meaning and extent of any representations
by the hospital-which likely would be based on an opinion
gradually formed over the years and not on any single
representation-imposes an unfair and improper burden on
the patient. 5
Thus, the court decided to impose a nondelegable duty on hospitals rather than
improperly apply apparent agency.
66
58. Simmons II, 341 S.C. 32, 533 S.E.2d 312 (2000).
59. Id. at 50, 533 S.E.2d at 322.
60. Id. at 42-44, 533 S.E.2d at 317-18.
61. Id. at 44, 533 S.E.2d at 318.
62. Id. at 50, 533 S.E.2d at 322.
63. Id. at 46, 533 S.E.2d at 319.
64. Simmons II, 341 S.C. at 48, 533 S.E.2d at 320.
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The court's opinion makes several points that support imposing a
nondelegable duty. Imposing a nondelegable duty fulfills both the
compensation and incentive goals of tort law, recognizes that hospitals play a
pivotal role in a range of actions that comprise the practice of medicine today,
and acknowledges the importance of hospital reputation in patient selection.
Noting these considerations, the court decided:
Given the fundamental shift in the role that a hospital plays in
our health care system, the commercialization of American
medicine, and the public perception of the unity of a hospital
and its emergency room, we hold that a hospital owes a
nondelegable duty to render competent service to its
61emergency room patients.
However, unlike the court of appeals, the supreme court did not conclude
that changed public perception required that the nondelegable duty imposed on
hospitals be absolute. Instead, the Supreme Court adopted the approach
outlined in section 429:68
One who employs an independent contractor to perform
services for another which are accepted in the reasonable
belief that the services are being rendered by the employer or
by his servants, is subject to liability for physical harm caused
by the negligence of the contractor in supplying such
services, to the same extent as though the employer were
supplying them himself or by his servants.69
Under section 429, the party accepting the services does not need to be the
party actually receiving the services.7" The section applies when the third party,
who accepts services on behalf of the injured party, reasonably believes the
service provider is the employer of the independent contractor performing the
services.71
As a result, the test in section 429 is very similar to the test for apparent
agency outlined in section 267 of the Restatement of Agency; however, the
burden imposed on the plaintiff is not as great. As stated by the South Carolina
Supreme Court:
Under section 429, the plaintiff must show that (1) the
hospital held itself out to the public by offering to provide
67. Id. at 50, 533 S.E.2d at 322.
68. Id. at 50-51, 533 S.E.2d at 322.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965).
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services; (2) the plaintiff looked to the hospital, rather than
the individual physician, for care; and (3) a person in similar
circumstances reasonably would have believed that the
physician who treated him or her was a hospital employee.72
If the plaintiff can satisfy this test, the hospital will be held vicariously liable;
however, the hospital can avoid liability by showing that the plaintiff failed to
prove the required elements.73
Therefore, the test under section 429 allows a court to increase a hospital's
exposure for the torts of its independent contractor physicians without requiring
either the plaintiff or the court to try and force the doctrine of apparent agency
to fit facts that often fail to prove the Restatement ofAgency test.74 Section 429
requires that the plaintiff look to the hospital's representations, rather than
those of the provider, to prove reliance. 7' This is usually easier for the plaintiff
to show, especially given hospitals' marketing campaigns.76 Even so, the
plaintiff is still required to show that she looked to the hospital rather than the
physician for medical services and must show reasonable reliance.77 In other
words, section 429 is not a rubber stamp imposing the court of appeals' strict
liability in a different guise.
As the supreme court notes, many otherjurisdictions have endorsed section
429." However, from the beginning, South Carolina has given the rule greater
reach than many courts have directly acknowledged.79 The court's opinion
clearly states that the applicability of the nondelegable duty rule is not limited
to cases involving emergency room physicians."0 The only limitation is that
supplied by the test itself: the patient must have sought the services of the
hospital as an institution rather than relying on the recommendation of the
patient's own physician, and the service provider must be someone who could
reasonably be viewed as a hospital's employee." Thus, after Simmons II, South
72. Simmons II, 341 S.C. at 51, 533 S.E.2d at 322.
73. Id.
74. McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3, at 461-62.
75. See id. at 460.
76. See id.
77. Simmons II, 341 S.C. at 52, 533 S.E.2d at 322.
78. Id. at 51, 533 S.E.2d at 322 (citing cases).
79. Unlike South Carolina courts, many courts in other jurisdictions have based their
holdings on the notion that a hospital holds itself out as a provider of medical services through
its emergency room. These courts have either limited their decision to emergency room patients
or have simply not directly stated that the liability of the hospital may extend beyond the
emergency room. See Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1382-83 (Alaska 1987); Brown v.
Coastal Emergency Servs., Inc., 354 S.E.2d. 632,639 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Paintsville Hosp. Co.
v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Ky. 1985); Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 426 N.E.2d 1187,1190
(Ohio Ct. App. 1980); Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970, 979 (Wash. Ct. App.
1978); Torrence v. Kusminsky, 408 S.E.2d 684, 692 (W. Va. 1991).




Jolley: Simmons v. Tuomey Regional Medical Center and Osborne v. Adams: E
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Carolina allowed claims against hospitals for the torts of independent
contractor physicians based on both the doctrine of apparent agency (under
section 267 of the Restatement of Agency) and the nondelegable duty of
hospitals to provide competent medical care for their emergency room patients
when the patient can satisfy the test provided in section 429 of the Restatement
of Torts.
V. OSBORNE V. ADAMS
With its decision in Osborne 1,s2 the South Carolina Supreme Court
dismissed any suppositions that the nondelegable duty of hospitals is a
conservative doctrine. In the case, Marianne Osborne's son, Connor, was born
nine weeks premature and received care at McLeod Regional Care Center's
neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). 3 After Connor developed severe
problems, including cerebral palsy and mental retardation, Osborne brought
claims against the hospital and the two neonatalogists that provided care to
Connor in McLeod's NICU.84 She alleged that Connor's health problems
developed as a result of the mismanagement of his respiratory distress while in
the NICU."5 Osborne argued that the hospital had an absolute, nondelegable
duty to care for its NICU patients and, therefore, was liable for the torts of its
neonatalogists, despite their status as independent contractors.8 6
The trial court granted McLeod's motion for summary judgment, finding
that Osborne "failed to present any expert testimony whatsoever ... which
creates an issue of fact as to any negligence on the part of [McLeod]." 7 The
court of appeals, which heard and decided the case before the supreme court
issued its decision in Simmons II, refused to extend its holding in Simmons Ion
the ground that newborn care in a hospital's NICU does not present the same
public policy reasons that compelled the Simmons I decision."8 The court of
appeals distinguished Simmons Iby noting that Osborne went to McLeod at the
direction and under the care of her regular obstetrician, rather than through an
emergency room, and there is no regulatory requirement for a hospital to
operate a Level III perinatal unit.89 However, the supreme court reversed the
court of appeals and retroactively applied its Simmons II rule, overturning the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of McLeod.9"
82. 346 S.C. 4, 550 S.E.2d 319 (2001).
83. Id. at 6, 550 S.E.2d at 320.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Osborne v. Adams, 338 S.C. 82, 86, 525 S.E.2d 268, 271 (Ct. App. 1999) [hereinafter
Osborne I].
87. Id. at 85, 525 S.E.2d at 270.
88. Id. at 89, 525 S.E.2d at 272.
89. Id.
90. Osborne 11, 346 S.C. at 13, 550 S.E.2d at 324.
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A. Goals of a Nondelegable Duty and the Reasons Behind the Decision
At first glance, the supreme court's decision in Osborne llmay appear less
important than Simmons Ilbecause Osborne II simply applied the Simmons II
holding. However, Osborne II offers a concrete example and application to
which Simmons I only hinted. The court's opinion in Osborne Illays out each
element of the Simmons II test to establish liability and ultimately determines
that Osborne presented evidence which showed McLeod had a nondelegable
duty, as defined by section 429 of the Restatement of Torts.91 First, McLeod
had "[held] itself out to the public as having specialized facilities, equipment
and staff for the provision of high quality obstetrical care."92 Second, Osborne
decided to have her baby at McLeod rather than another hospital, based largely
on the marketing of its birthing and neonatology facilities and staff.93 Osborne
alleged that she had assumed the neonatologists were employees of McLeod
and that she never selected any of them to care for her son.94 Finally, Osborne
stated that she could not remember any distinction between the hospital's
employees and the independent-contractor neonatologists in the McLeod
marketing materials.95 The court found it may be reasonable for Osborne to
have assumed that the neonatologists were McLeod employees.9
The supreme court's application of the Simmons II test in Osborne II is
straightforward. Because the supreme court clearly stated in Simmons Ilthat its
holding was not limited to the context of emergency room physicians and
patients, imposing a nondelegable duty on a hospital for the negligence of an
independent-contractor neonatologist in the hospital's NICU was not a large
inferential step for the Osborne II court. It did not introduce a new test into
South Carolina law. However, like other small steps that turn out to be giant
leaps into new territory, the Osborne II decision brings issues to the forefront
that were not immediately obvious when the court initially imposed
nondelegable duties on hospitals.
As the supreme court noted, overturning McLeod's summaryjudgment did
not mean that Osborne would prevail on the facts at trial.98 Despite the pro-
plaintiff posture of the section 429 test, various facts present in the case weigh
against Osborne. For example, the Simmons II court limited its holding to
patients who entered the hospital emergency room solely based on their
reliance of the hospital's reputation.99 Thus, a hospital did not assume a
91. Id. at 8-10, 550 S.E.2d at 321-23.
92. Id. at 8, 550 S.E.2d at 322.
93. Id. at 9, 550 S.E.2d at 322.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 10, 550 S.E.2d at 322.
96. Osborne II, 346 S.C. at 10, 550 S.E.2d at 322.
97. 341 S.C. 32, 52, 533 S.E.2d 312, 323 (2000).
98. Osborne II, 346 S.C. at 13, 550 S.E.2d at 324. The supreme court's holding simply
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Id.
99. 341 S.C. at 52, 533 S.E.2d at 323.
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nondelegable duty to provide competent care for patients who come to the
hospital based on their physician's advice or who enter an emergency room in
order to meet with their regular physician. However, the facts of Osborne 11fall
into a gray area not discussed in Simmons II. First, Osborne came to the
hospital under the care of her general gynecologist and was already receiving
care when her son entered the NICU.'00 If the allegedly negligent physicians
were the only neonatologists practicing at McLeod, then it may be difficult for
Osborne to prove her reliance was based on the hospital's reputation rather than
a medical necessity.01 In addition, because Osborne was a pharmacist
employed by McLeod, the trial court will have to gauge the extent to which
Osborne chose McLeod based on the economic benefits it offered to her as an
employee." 2 The court will also have to determine whether, as a pharmacist at
McLeod, Osborne knew or should have known that the hospital's physicians
were independent contractors and not employees.1
0 3
These factual issues probably do not exist in most nondelegable duty cases.
In most cases, it is unlikely a hospital can show that a patient failed to prove
reliance if the hospital has engaged in any marketing in the community. 1 The
Simmons II decision discounted the value of printed notices that disclaim any
liability for the torts of independent contractors, so it is difficult to see how
hospitals can effectively market a lack of liability.'05 Therefore, statements in
hospital magazines and bulletins that say something similar to "physicians, and
only physicians, practice medicine at McLeod hospital" are of dubious value.
Practically, it appears hospitals may be saddled with an absolute duty after all.
B. A CloserLook: Public Policy and Expansion ofHospital TortLiability
The supreme court's decision in Osborne Iis exemplary on many counts.
Unlike most courts, which rely on a loose doctrine of apparent agency or
impose nondelegeable duties in order to impose liability on hospitals for the
torts of their independent contractors, the South Carolina Supreme Court has
analyzed the new perceptions of hospitals as medical service providers with
traditional legal principles.1 6 Recognizing that public policy requires greater
hospital liability than the traditional apparent agency doctrine can provide, the
100. Osborne I, 338 S.C. 82, 85, 525 S.E.2d 268, 270 (Ct. App. 1999).
101. See Osborne II, 346 S.C. at 9, 550 S.E.2d at 322.
102. See Osborne I, 338 S.C. at 85, 525 S.E.2d at 270.
103. See id.
104. For example, if a hospital has participated in any community-wide marketing
activities, like mailings or newspaper ads, it will be difficult for a hospital to prove that the
plaintiff did not see any of these marketing attempts and, therefore, rely on them. Such marketing
activities may essentially satisfy both the first and the second elements of section 429: (1) it has
held itself out as a medical service provider and (2) it has enabled the plaintiff to say she chose
the hospital for the benefits it provides. See Osborne If, 346 S.C. at 810, 550 S.E.2d at 321-22.
105. 341 S.C. 32, 47-48, 533 S.E.2d 318, 320 (2000).
106. See McWilliams & Russell, supra note 3 (discussing how courts have interpreted and
applied tests adopted from the Restatement of Torts and Restatement ofAgency).
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court has adopted a different, more lenient test based on section 429 of the
Restatement of Torts, instead of loosening the requirements of the traditional
apparent agency doctrine under section 267 of the Restatement of Agency.1
0 7
The court has walked a thin line between liberally imposing liability on
hospitals and throwing up its hands in the face of a changing policy climate to
allow public perception to dictate the law.
However, there is a problem with imposing a nondelegable duty on a
hospital for torts occurring outside of the emergency room, though this problem
is not plainly evident from the courts' reasoning. Both the court of appeals and
the defendant hospital in Osborne II attempted to distinguish the actions of an
independent contractor physician in the emergency room from those of an
independent contractor neonatologist based on the fact that South Carolina
hospitals are required to maintain emergency rooms but not NICUs. In
response, the supreme court noted that, although McLeod was not required to
operate a NICU, it sought and acquired the Level III designation from the
Department of Health and Environmental Control and thereby voluntarily
assumed the duties required of an entity with a Level III designation.'0 8 It
should be not6d that, based on this reasoning, the supreme court rightly
declined to distinguish Osborne I/from Simmons I. It correctly recognized that
enforcing a public policy based on the public's perception of hospitals as
medical service providers should extend to all services that the public perceive
as being performed by the hospital, regardless of whether these services take
place in an emergency room or a NICU.
However, a different view of this issue reveals a problem. South Carolina
courts, like most other courts, treat public policy as if it were a single,
mobilized concern, and nothing in Simmons II or Osborne II offers guidance
for those situations when public policies conflict. There is conflict between
imposing a duty based on public perception and the results of imposing such
duties. Burdened by the duty under the extension of Osborne II, some hospitals
may seek to close down a particular medical facility to avoid that duty.
Hospitals must maintain emergency rooms, yet they are not required to have
NICUs.'09 Therefore, courts can impose a nondelegable duty on hospitals to
provide competent care for their emergency room patients without worrying
about the ultimate impact of the duty on patient access. After all, a hospital
would not choose to close down entirely in order to avoid the additional
liability imposed by the Simmons II decision.
The situation is not as clear in the case of NICUs. As the supreme court
noted, hospitals "opt in" for additional requirements when they seek a Level III
designation. 1' Supposedly they do this because, in today's commercialized
medical environment, NICUs make good economic sense. For example, if
107. Simmons II, 341 S.C. at 50-52, 533 S.E.2d at 322-23.
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NICUs become too expensive to operate due to increased liability insurance,
why would a hospital not simply opt out and close down its NICU? Already,
hospital departments across the country are facing closure because of these
increased insurance costs."' Imposing greater liability on hospitals may
improve the quality of care available to patients, but it may also decrease the
range of services available. At some level, imposing quality at the cost of the
services themselves is itself against public policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
As courts across the country have noted, public perception of the role of
hospitals in society has changed. A community hospital today is simply another
medical service provider that should not deserve special legal immunity. The
demise of the doctrine of charitable immunity clearly follows this change in
public perception. However, it is not clear that today's hospitals deserve to
have a special liability imposed on them any more than they deserve to have
special immunity from liability. In its Simmons II decision, the South Carolina
Supreme Court avoided the murky precedent set by most state courts and
imposed a nondelegable duty on hospitals to provide competent care for their
emergency room patients. By relying on section 429 of the Restatement of
Torts, the court has skirted the difficult issue of patient reliance under the
doctrine of apparent agency and has avoided the direct imposition of strict
liability on hospitals for the torts of all employees and independent contractors.
However, except in cases with facts very similar to Osborne II in which a
plaintiff has or should have special knowledge of the hospital, the elements of
section 429 appear easy to satisfy.
In fact, section 429 may prove to be such an easy burden for plaintiffs to
carry that it paves the way toward strict hospital liability. Decreased access to
care may result if courts apply a nondelegable duty on hospitals as a whole,
rather than limiting the duty to hospital emergency rooms. All hospitals have
independent contractors performing functions without which the hospital could
not operate. These functions-emergency room services, anesthesiology, and
radiology-are usually required by statute and support other hospital services.
Patients enter hospitals reason bly assuming that the hospital will offer certain
services; the current perceptiun of hospitals as medical service providers
111. See Betsy Bates, Liability Crisis Drives Away OBs, OB. GYN. NEWS, June 15, 2002,
at 1; Bob LaMendola, Hospitals to Close Maternity Wards; High Malpractice Insurance Costs
Have Forced Two Providers to Stop Delivering Babies, A Choice Other Sites are Weighing, S.
FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 21, 2002, at IB; Marie McCullough, High Costs Shrink Maternity
Care-In 2 Years, 7 Hospital Units in the Region Have Closed Because of Malpractice
Premiums. Some Fear Losses Will Bring Danger, THE PHILA. INQUIRER, July 7, 2002, at Al;
Margaret Ann Miille, Doctors Hospital Will Close Obstetrics, SARASOTA HERALD-TRiB.
(Florida), Aug. 30,2002, at A 1; Small Maternity Wards Closing, THE CINCINNATI POST, Apr. 22,
2002, at 6A; Donna Wright, Hospitals in Area Expect More Births, THE BRADENTON HERALD
(Florida), Oct. 3, 2002, at 1.
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supports the imposition of a nondelegable duty on the hospital to provide these
services competently. After all, these are the essential services that a hospital
must provide in order to operate as a hospital.
However, imposing nondelegeable duties on hospitals to provide
competent, non-inherent function services is not as easy to justify. When a
patient can show that she detrimentally relied on a hospital's marketing in
choosing to receive care at the hospital, it seems appropriate to impose a duty
on that hospital to provide that care competently. However, practically, the only
way hospitals can avoid liability from a nondelegable duty imposed under
section 429 is to (1) not market any physicians or services or (2) publicize the
relationship of the hospital and its physicians in a manner the court will accept
as a waiver of liability. Situations that fulfill the second possibility are unlikely,
and neither option is attractive for hospitals competing in today's
commercialized medical arena.
Unfortunately, imposing increased liability on hospitals may ultimately
hurt those it is meant to benefit-the patients. Hospitals may simply choose to
eliminate those services, like neonatology, that become cost prohibitive.
Increased costs and limited access would then impose an even greater burden
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